HP HPE7-A02 Aruba Certified Network Security Professional Exam Exam Practice Test

ClearPass OnGuard uses a Posture Policy object to define:

Which checks are performed (e.g., AV installed, firewall status, patches)

How the results map to posture tokens such as “Healthy,” “Quarantined,” etc.

The official OnGuard configuration workflow states that you must first “Define the posture policy”, and that these posture policies contain the rules for evaluating health and determining posture tokens.

Service enforcement policies then consume the posture token (e.g., Tips:Posture = Healthy) but do not define the posture conditions themselves. The “Posture” tab on a service is used to enable posture and associate it with the posture policy; the detailed rules live in the posture policy object.

Therefore, posture logic is defined by creating rules within a posture policy → Option A.

To control which commands managers are allowed to enter on AOS-CX switches using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as a TACACS+ server, you need to add the Shell service to the TACACS+ enforcement profiles for the managers. This service allows you to define and enforce specific command sets and access privileges for users authenticated via TACACS+. By configuring the Shell service in the enforcement profile, you can specify the commands that are permitted or denied for the managers, ensuring controlled and secure access to the switch's command-line interface.

Syslog Integration with CPPM:

ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can integrate with third-party firewalls via Syslog messages to detect and respond to internal threats.

The Syslog integration enables CPPM to gather context on suspicious activity and enforce appropriate policies such as isolating attackers by working with network devices like Aruba switches and APs.

Option A: Correct. This method allows for dynamic response to threats and leverages existing infrastructure without requiring major reconfiguration.

Option B: Incorrect. CPDI is primarily used for profiling devices, not directly for threat response based on Syslog information.

Option C: Incorrect. While it is possible for CPPM to poll information, this approach is less dynamic and not focused on immediate threat response.

Option D: Incorrect. Tunnel mode SSIDs and UBT are designed for forwarding user traffic securely but do not directly enhance threat detection or mitigation.

Aruba firewall / role access rules are evaluated top-down, first-match wins; once a rule matches, no later rules are processed.

Let’s walk the packet through the ordered rules:

The traffic is SSH, not UDP/67 ⇒ rule 1 does not match.

Destination 10.1.7.12 is not in 10.1.4.0/23 ⇒ rule 2 does not match.

10.1.7.12 is in 10.1.0.0/18 ⇒ rule 3 matches first.

Rule 3 action: Deny any to 10.1.0.0/18 + log.

Because rule 3 already matched, the later “Deny SSH to 10.1.0.0/21 + denylist” rule is never evaluated, so no denylist is applied.

Aruba documentation for session ACLs and firewall rules explicitly states that rules are evaluated from top to bottom and “the first match terminates further evaluation,” and logging/denylist flags on a rule are applied only when that specific rule matches.

So the outcome is: the SSH traffic is dropped and logged, but the client is not denylisted → Option B.

When using OpenSSL to obtain a certificate signed by a Certification Authority (CA), you should submit the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) file, which is file1.pem, to the CA. The CSR contains the information about the entity requesting the certificate and the public key, but not the private key, which is in file2.pem. The CA uses the information in the CSR to create and sign the certificate.

1.CSR Submission: The CSR (file1.pem) includes the public key and the entity information required by the CA to issue a certificate.

2.Private Key Security: The private key (file2.pem) should never be sent to the CA or shared; it remains securely stored on the requestor’s server.

3.Certificate Issuance: After the CA signs the CSR, the resulting certificate can be used with the private key to establish secure communications.

If VIA clients are not receiving IP addresses from the configured VPN pool, one setting to check is whether the pool is associated with the role to which the VIA clients are being assigned. The association between the IP pool and the role ensures that clients assigned to that role receive IP addresses from the correct pool.

1.Role Association: Each role can be associated with a specific IP pool, ensuring that clients assigned to the role receive addresses from the intended pool.

2.IP Allocation: Proper configuration of the IP pool and its association with the role is crucial for correct IP address allocation.

3.VIA Configuration: Ensuring that all settings, including IP pool associations, are correctly configured, facilitates seamless client connectivity.

Hub-Spoke VPN Configuration:

HPE Aruba Central SD-WAN Orchestrator enables hub-spoke topology where branch gateways (BGWs) connect to VPN concentrators (VPNCs) located at data centers.

A key step in configuring this is defining which VPNCs the BGWs will prefer for connectivity.

The DC Preference List is configured in the BGW groups to prioritize the data centers to which BGWs connect.

Option Analysis:

Option A: Incorrect. VPN pools control IP allocation, not which branches connect to VPNCs.

Option B: Incorrect. IKE policies define key exchange mechanisms but are not part of the connection preference process.

Option C: Correct. Admins configure a DC preference list in BGW groups to determine connectivity priorities with VPNCs.

Option D: Incorrect. IPsec policies define encryption parameters at a global level, but this is not specific to the hub-spoke connection configuration.

To control which commands managers are allowed to execute on AOS-CX switches using ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as a TACACS+ server, you must configure the Shell service in the TACACS+ enforcement profile. The Shell service provides the ability to define granular access controls for commands. It supports policy-driven command authorization, which is essential in controlling administrative tasks based on roles.

References

Official HPE Aruba ClearPass documentation on TACACS+ integration and command authorization.

Industry best practices for AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) configuration in network security architectures.

On Aruba Mobility Controllers, dataplane captures can include wireless frames encapsulated inside GRE (for example, ERM / remote mirroring or tunneled 802.11 data). If Wireshark does not have GRE dissection enabled, these packets may appear as generic IP/UDP payloads, and the inner traffic (client frames) will not decode correctly.

MC dataplane is exactly where GRE-encapsulated user traffic is likely to appear. Enabling GRE in Wireshark allows you to see and decode the inner payload (802.11/Ethernet/IP).

MC control plane traffic is generally not GRE encapsulated data traffic.

For gateways, captures exported as ERM over UDP often require different decoding (e.g., ARUBA_ERM, not generic GRE).

Thus, the most appropriate case to ensure GRE is enabled is when the capture came from the MC dataplane → Option D.

When transitioning from Intrusion Detection System (IDS) mode to Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) mode, it’s critical to review and refine configurations to ensure legitimate traffic is not blocked. Here's the reasoning behind each option:

A. Disable traffic inspection and reboot before re-enabling traffic inspection with the new mode.

Incorrect:

Transitioning to IPS mode does not require a full reboot or disabling traffic inspection.

This step is unnecessary and could lead to downtime that impacts network operations.

B. Change the mode on one gateway at a time to establish a smoother transition period.

Incorrect:

While a phased approach might help in some large deployments, it does not directly address the potential for legitimate traffic to be blocked by IPS mode.

IPS operates in real-time, so misconfigured rules or policies need to be addressed before enabling IPS on any gateway.

C. Consider applying a stricter IPS policy to minimize issues during the transition period.

Incorrect:

A stricter IPS policy increases the likelihood of false positives, which could disrupt legitimate business-critical traffic.

During the transition, the focus should be on minimizing disruptions by fine-tuning policies, not making them stricter.

D. Check for legitimate traffic that has been flagged as a threat and allow list the associated rules.

Correct:

In IDS mode, the system only detects and logs suspicious traffic but does not block it. Reviewing these logs for false positives allows the organization to fine-tune policies and allow list legitimate traffic before transitioning to IPS mode.

By doing this, the company ensures that IPS mode will block actual threats while permitting legitimate traffic.

This is a proactive step to prevent unnecessary disruptions to normal operations when IPS mode is enabled.

References

HPE Aruba Gateway IDS/IPS Configuration Guide.

Best Practices for Transitioning from IDS to IPS Modes in Aruba Networks.

Aruba Network Threat Management Documentation.

To ensure that the correct profiles apply after client attributes are updated based on Syslog messages, you should tune the Change of Authorization (CoA) delay on the ClearPass servers to a value of 5 seconds or greater. This delay allows sufficient time for the attribute updates to be processed and for the reauthentication to occur correctly, ensuring that the updated profiles are accurately applied to the clients.

1.CoA Delay: Adjusting the CoA delay ensures that the system has enough time to update client attributes and reauthenticate them properly before applying new profiles.

2.Profile Accuracy: This delay helps in preventing premature reauthentication and ensures that the most recent attribute updates are considered when applying profiles.

3.System Synchronization: Ensures synchronization between the attribute update and the reauthentication process.

Installing Agents for SSE (Secure Service Edge):

Agents installed on remote users' devices allow posture checks (e.g., antivirus status, OS version) to ensure compliance.

Based on the results of the posture checks, different permissions and security policies can be applied dynamically.

This improves the security posture of remote users before granting access to resources.

Option A: Correct. Agents enable posture checks and enforce conditional access based on compliance.

Option B: Incorrect. Admins manage SSE policies centrally, not via agents.

Option C: Incorrect. Access to private servers via SSH does not require agents; it relies on policies and tunnels.

Option D: Incorrect. Local sandboxing is generally a function of endpoint protection solutions, not SSE agents.

Policy Analysis:

Rule Evaluation Order: Rules are applied in sequential order until a match is found.

Key Points:

DHCP traffic (UDP 67) is permitted.

DNS traffic (UDP 53) is permitted.

Traffic to 10.5.5.0/24 is explicitly denied.

HTTP traffic (TCP 80) is allowed only to 10.5.0.0/16.

HTTPS traffic (TCP 443) is allowed only to 10.5.0.0/16.

All other traffic to 10.5.0.0/16 is denied.

Any other traffic not matching the above rules is permitted.

Scenario Analysis:

The client IP 10.2.2.2 does not fall within the 10.5.0.0/16 subnet.

Rule 3 denies traffic to 10.5.5.5, regardless of the source IP.

Option A: Correct. HTTPS traffic to 10.5.5.5 is explicitly denied by Rule 3.

Option B: Incorrect. Traffic to 203.0.113.12 is permitted due to the final "permit any" rule.

Option C: Incorrect. The client (10.2.2.2) does not belong to the subnet 10.5.0.0/16, so traffic to 10.5.3.3 is not permitted by Rule 5.

Option D: Incorrect. HTTP traffic to 198.51.100.12 is allowed by the last "permit any" rule.

A conflict in the Endpoints Repository usually indicates that ClearPass has seen different profiling data for the same MAC, which might mean a spoofing attempt—or simply normal behavior for certain device types.

Devices that use PXE boot often:

Boot initially from the network with one set of characteristics (e.g., a minimal OS, different DHCP fingerprint),

Then chain-load into a different OS with a different fingerprint and sometimes even a different network profile.

Aruba exam and design material specifically point out PXE boot as a common, benign cause of profiler conflicts and recommend tuning cluster-wide profiler parameters to ignore or relax some conflicts for these devices.

Therefore, you look at whether the company has devices that use PXE boot when deciding whether to tune profiler conflict behavior → Option D.

When integrating ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) with ClearPass Device Insight (CPDI), it is important to understand how device profiling and classification work between the two solutions:

1. CPPM and CPDI Integration Overview

CPPM is primarily used for access control and policy enforcement, while CPDI specializes in device profiling and classification through advanced analytics and machine learning.

Integration allows CPPM to leverage CPDI's enhanced profiling capabilities for more accurate device identification and policy enforcement.

2. Detailed Analysis of Each Option

A. CPPM no longer supports any Device Profiler features and relies on CPDI for this profile information:

Incorrect: CPPM still supports its own basic device profiling features and can operate independently. However, when integrated with CPDI, CPPM can use CPDI’s advanced profiling capabilities as a supplement.

B. CPDI must be configured as an audit server on CPPM for the integration to be successful:

Incorrect: CPDI is not configured as an audit server on CPPM. Integration is achieved via API integration and communication between the two solutions, not through audit server settings.

C. CPDI must have security analysis disabled on it for the integration to be successful:

Incorrect: Security analysis does not need to be disabled for integration. In fact, CPDI’s security analysis enhances the classification process by identifying anomalous behaviors.

D. CPPM can submit profile information to CPDI, but if CPDI derives a different classification, CPDI takes precedence:

Correct:

CPPM and CPDI exchange profile data, but CPDI has more advanced device classification capabilities due to its machine learning-based engine.

When CPDI derives a different classification than CPPM, CPDI's classification is considered more accurate and takes precedence.

This ensures that policies are based on the most reliable device classification.

References

Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager and Device Insight Integration Guide.

ClearPass Device Profiling and Classification Documentation.

Best Practices for CPPM and CPDI Integration in Network Security.

When creating a rule in an HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) role mapping policy that references a ClearPass Device Insight Tag, you should specify the "Endpoint" Type (namespace) for the rule. This ensures that the policy can properly reference and utilize the tags assigned to endpoints by ClearPass Device Insight for making role mapping decisions.

1.Endpoint Tags: ClearPass Device Insight assigns tags to endpoints based on their characteristics and behaviors. These tags are stored in the "Endpoint" namespace.

2.Role Mapping: By referencing the "Endpoint" type, the rule can accurately match endpoints with the specified tags and apply the appropriate role mappings based on the device's profile.

3.Policy Consistency: Ensuring that the correct namespace is used maintains consistency and accuracy in role assignment policies.

A typical use case for using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Onboard is to provision unmanaged devices to succeed at certificate-based 802.1X authentication. ClearPass Onboard allows users to securely configure their personal devices with the necessary certificates and network settings to authenticate on the network using 802.1X, which enhances security and simplifies the onboarding process for unmanaged devices.

1.Certificate-Based Authentication: ClearPass Onboard simplifies the process of issuing and installing certificates on unmanaged devices, ensuring they can authenticate securely using 802.1X.

2.User-Friendly Onboarding: The Onboard process is user-friendly, guiding users through the steps needed to configure their devices for network access.

3.Enhanced Security: By using certificates for authentication, the solution provides a higher level of security compared to traditional username/password methods.

Contextual Exchange for Better Decisions:

HPE Aruba ClearPass can integrate with third-party solutions like MDM and firewalls to exchange contextual information about endpoints (e.g., device type, posture, location).

This integration allows ClearPass and the third-party solutions to make better access control and security decisions.

For example:

An MDM can inform CPPM about device compliance, and CPPM can adjust enforcement policies dynamically.

Firewalls can receive updated context about users and devices to enforce policies more effectively.

Option Analysis:

Option A: Correct. Exchanging contextual information improves access control decisions.

Option B: Incorrect. CPPM does not provide signature-based threat detection.

Option C: Incorrect. CPPM does not offload policy decisions; it integrates for collaboration.

Option D: Incorrect. CPPM does not replace third-party traffic filtering capabilities.

Gateway Threat Count Alert

This alert indicates that the gateway has detected threats in traffic passing through it. HPE Aruba Networking Central provides tools to investigate and analyze these threats in detail.

Analysis of Each Option

A. Use HPE Aruba Networking Central tools to run a Network Check on the gateway with which the alert is associated:

Incorrect:

Network Check tools in Central are primarily used for connectivity and performance diagnostics, not for analyzing detected threats.

This does not provide insight into the specific threats triggering the Gateway Threat Count alert.

B. Use Live Monitoring on the gateway to download a packet capture of recent traffic flowing through the gateway:

Incorrect:

Live Monitoring and packet capture can provide raw traffic data, but interpreting this requires significant manual analysis.

The Gateway Threat Count alert already provides summarized threat insights that are easier to access via the threat list.

C. Check the threat list for the gateway associated with the alert. Access threat details and download packet info:

Correct:

The threat list is specifically designed to display detailed information about detected threats, such as their type, severity, and source/destination.

Administrators can access this list in Central for the affected gateway, view granular details, and even download associated packet data for deeper inspection.

D. Check the gateway's Audit Trail in HPE Aruba Networking Central for more details about the threats that triggered the alert:

Incorrect:

The Audit Trail tracks configuration changes and administrative actions, not the details of detected threats.

It is not relevant for investigating the Gateway Threat Count alert.

Final Recommendation

To gather more information about what caused the Gateway Threat Count alert to trigger, check the threat list for the associated gateway. This provides detailed threat information and the option to download packet data for further analysis.

References

HPE Aruba Networking Central Threat Management Guide.

Understanding Gateway IDS/IPS Alerts in Aruba Central Documentation.

Best Practices for Threat Investigation Using Aruba Central.

After installing an HPE Aruba Networking Network Analytic Engine (NAE) script on an AOS-CX switch, the additional step required to start the monitoring is to create an agent from the script. The agent is responsible for executing the script and collecting the monitoring data as defined by the script parameters.

1.Script Installation: Installing the script provides the logic and parameters for monitoring.

2.Agent Creation: Creating an agent from the script activates the monitoring process, allowing the NAE to begin tracking the specified function.

3.Operational Step: This step ensures that the monitoring logic is applied and the data collection starts as per the script’s configuration.

The preferred method for assigning clients to a role on the AOS firewall is to configure HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to assign the role using a RADIUS enforcement profile with an Aruba-User-Role VSA (Vendor-Specific Attribute). This method allows ClearPass to dynamically assign the appropriate user roles to clients during the authentication process, ensuring that role-based access policies are consistently enforced across the network.

Applying a time range to a firewall rule on an AOS device fulfills the use case of enforcing the rule only during the specified time range. This allows administrators to control when specific firewall rules are active, which can be useful for implementing policies that only need to be in effect during certain hours, such as blocking or allowing access to specific resources outside of business hours.

1.Time-Based Enforcement: The firewall rule will be active only during the specified time range, ensuring that the rule's policies are enforced only when needed.

2.Use Case: This feature is useful for scenarios like limiting access to certain applications or websites during working hours, or enabling enhanced security measures during off-hours.

3.Flexibility: Provides flexibility in security policy management by allowing dynamic adjustment of rules based on time schedules.

In a client-to-site VPN based on tunnel-mode IPsec, the remote clients and a gateway at the main site are responsible for the IPsec encapsulation. The remote clients initiate the VPN connection and encapsulate their traffic in IPsec, which is then decapsulated by the gateway at the main site.

1.IPsec Encapsulation: The remote clients encapsulate their traffic using IPsec protocols before sending it over the internet to the main site.

2.Gateway Role: The gateway at the main site receives the encapsulated traffic, decapsulates it, and forwards it to the internal network. Similarly, traffic from the main site to the remote clients is encapsulated by the gateway and decapsulated by the clients.

3.Security: This setup ensures that data is securely transmitted between the remote clients and the main site, protecting it from eavesdropping and tampering.

When setting up a ClearPass cluster, it is critical to ensure secure communication between the cluster nodes and the client devices. For this purpose, certain certificates must be properly configured.

1. Why HTTPS Requires a CA-Signed Certificate?

HTTPS communication is used for inter-cluster communication and for the web-based user interface that administrators use to manage the ClearPass cluster.

Before joining the cluster, it is strongly recommended to install a CA-signed HTTPS certificate on the Subscriber to ensure secure communication and prevent warnings/errors due to untrusted certificates.

Without a CA-signed certificate, the Subscriber might use a self-signed certificate, leading to security risks and lack of trust validation.

2. Analysis of Other Certificate Types

B. Database:

Incorrect: Database communications within ClearPass clusters are secured using internal certificates or keys. These are not user-facing and do not require a CA-signed certificate before joining the cluster.

C. RADIUS/EAP:

Incorrect: RADIUS/EAP certificates are important for client authentication, but they are not required on the Subscriber prior to cluster joining. These can be configured after the Subscriber is part of the cluster.

D. RadSec:

Incorrect: RadSec is an optional feature for secure RADIUS communication over TLS, and its certificate configuration is typically performed post-cluster setup.

Final Recommendation

To ensure secure cluster operations and seamless web-based management, a CA-signed HTTPS certificate should be installed on the Subscriber before it joins the ClearPass cluster.

References

ClearPass Deployment Guide for Version 6.9.

Best Practices for Certificate Management in ClearPass Clusters.

HPE Aruba ClearPass Cluster Configuration Guide.

To configure the HPE Aruba Networking VIA solution for remote employees who need to download their VIA connection profile from the VPN Concentrator (VPNC) and ensure that only those who authenticate with their domain credentials through ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can do so, you need to set up a VIA Authentication Profile. This profile should use the CPPM's RADIUS server group. Once the VIA Authentication Profile is created, you need to reference this profile in the VIA Web Authentication Profile. This configuration ensures that the authentication process requires employees to validate their credentials via CPPM before they can download the VIA connection profile.

Why MD5 Authentication on Lag 1 is Preferred:

Lag 1 is the primary link between Switch-2 and Switch-1, both of which are Layer 3 switches running OSPF.

By enabling MD5 authentication, OSPF routers exchange authenticated packets, preventing unauthorized or rogue OSPF routers from forming adjacencies or injecting routes.

MD5 is a secure authentication method and ensures the integrity and authenticity of OSPF communications.

Other Options Analysis:

A. Configure OSPF authentication on VLANs 10-19 in password mode: While configuring authentication on VLAN interfaces could secure VLAN-specific OSPF traffic, it is less effective because the main threat of rogue OSPF comes from unauthorized L3 devices connected via the backbone (Lag 1).

C. Disable OSPF entirely on VLANs 10-19: Disabling OSPF on these VLANs is not a preferred solution because OSPF is needed to route traffic in this design.

D. Configure passive-interface as the OSPF default and disable OSPF passive on Lag 1: While passive interfaces prevent OSPF from forming adjacencies, it does not directly prevent rogue routers. Passive mode only limits OSPF advertisements on specific interfaces.

Custom Device Fingerprinting on CPPM:

To create a custom fingerprint, you first need to connect a known device of that type to the network.

CPPM will discover the device in its Endpoints Repository, allowing you to analyze its attributes (e.g., MAC OUI, DHCP options) and create custom profiling rules.

Option Analysis:

Option A: Correct. Discovering a known device in the Endpoints Repository is a prerequisite for creating accurate custom fingerprint rules.

Option B: Incorrect. CPDI integration is not required for custom fingerprints on CPPM.

Option C: Incorrect. XML rules are not pre-defined; they are created dynamically based on observed attributes.

Option D: Incorrect. The "Automatically download Endpoint Profiler Fingerprints" setting is unrelated to custom profiling.

MAC Spoofing Detection with Endpoint Conflict:

When two devices attempt to use the same MAC address, ClearPass identifies a Conflict state in the Endpoints Repository.

This condition can be used to detect and quarantine clients that spoof legitimate devices.

Option D: Correct. The Conflict EQUALS true condition identifies devices with duplicate MAC addresses.

Option A: Incorrect. Endpoint compliance checks posture, not MAC spoofing.

Option B: Incorrect. Device Insight Tags are used for profiling but do not identify conflicts.

Option C: Incorrect. Compromised devices relate to security incidents, not MAC address conflicts.

To ensure that HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can apply the correct access levels based on a client's device category after discovering new clients, you need to enable the "Profile Endpoints" option in the Service tab. This option allows CPPM to profile and categorize endpoints dynamically, ensuring that the appropriate access levels are applied based on the device's characteristics. Enabling this feature ensures that new devices are accurately profiled and that access policies can be enforced based on the updated device information.

To ensure that the AOS-CX switch properly assigns the "employees" role when using CPPM (ClearPass Policy Manager) as the RADIUS server, you should configure a RADIUS Enforcement profile on CPPM with the Aruba-User-Role VSA (Vendor-Specific Attribute) set to "employees". This configuration ensures that when an endpoint authenticates, CPPM sends the appropriate role assignment to the AOS-CX switch, which then applies the corresponding policies and VLAN settings defined for the "employees" role.

The "Detect Valid SSID Misuse" event in Aruba's Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) indicates that a valid SSID, associated with your network, is being broadcast from an unauthorized source. This scenario often signals a potential rogue access point attempting to deceive clients into connecting to it (e.g., for credential harvesting or man-in-the-middle attacks).

1. Explanation of Each Option

A. Clients are failing to authenticate to corporate SSIDs. You should first check for misconfigured authentication settings and then investigate a possible threat:

Incorrect:

This event is not related to authentication failures by legitimate clients.

Misconfigured authentication settings would lead to events like "authentication failures" or "radius issues," not "valid SSID misuse."

B. Admins have likely misconfigured SSID security settings on some of the company's APs. You should have them check those settings:

Incorrect:

This event refers to an external device broadcasting your SSID, not misconfiguration on the company’s authorized APs.

WIDS differentiates between valid corporate APs and rogue APs.

C. Hackers are likely trying to pose as authorized APs. You should use the detecting radio information and immediately track down the device that triggered the event:

Correct:

This is the most likely cause of the "detect valid SSID misuse" event. A rogue AP broadcasting a corporate SSID could lure clients into connecting to it, exposing sensitive credentials or traffic.

Immediate action includes:

Using the radio information from the event logs to identify the rogue AP's location.

Physically locating and removing the rogue device.

Strengthening WIPS/WIDS policies to prevent further misuse.

D. This event might be a threat but is almost always a false positive. You should wait to see the event over several days before following up on it:

Incorrect:

While false positives are possible, "valid SSID misuse" is a critical security event that should not be ignored.

Delaying action increases the risk of successful attacks against your network.

2. Recommended Steps to Address the Event

Review Event Logs:

Gather details about the rogue AP, such as SSID, MAC address, channel, and signal strength.

Locate the Rogue Device:

Use the detecting AP's radio information and signal strength to triangulate the rogue AP's physical location.

Respond to the Threat:

Remove or disable the rogue device.

Notify the security team for further investigation.

Prevent Future Misuse:

Strengthen security policies, such as enabling client whitelists or enhancing WIPS protection.

References

Aruba WIDS/WIPS Configuration and Best Practices Guide.

Aruba Central Security Event Analysis Documentation.

Wireless Threat Management Using Aruba Networks.

Access to the Onboard portal is controlled by a dedicated Pre-Auth service in ClearPass Policy Manager:

The “ClearPass Onboard Service Pre-Auth” service defines which authentication sources (e.g., AD domain, local DB, guest) are used when users log into the Onboard web portal.

To restrict access to domain users only, you edit this Pre-Auth service to use only the Active Directory auth source (and appropriate authorization checks, such as group membership).

Exam and configuration references for ClearPass Onboard clearly identify the Onboard Pre-Auth service as the place where you control who can log into the Onboard portal.

Network Settings and Provisioning profiles in Onboard govern SSID, profiles, and device configuration, not portal user authentication.

The 802.1X services for wireless control network access after onboarding, not login to the onboarding portal itself.

Therefore, to limit the portal to domain users, you should edit the ClearPass Onboard Service Pre-Auth service on CPPM → Option B.

ClearPass Role Mapping Policy:

The Endpoint namespace is used to reference attributes and tags related to endpoint devices.

Device Insight Tags are part of endpoint profiling information and are stored in the Endpoint Repository.

Option Analysis:

Option A: Correct. The Endpoint namespace includes Device Insight Tags.

Option B: Incorrect. TIPS refers to system attributes and configuration data, not endpoint tags.

Option C: Incorrect. Device is not a valid namespace in this context.

Option D: Incorrect. Application relates to application-level attributes, not Device Insight Tags.

Traffic Forwarding for APs:

In AOS-10, AP traffic forwarding can happen locally (bridged) or through tunnels to a gateway.

The VLAN settings on the "APs" role depend on whether the APs bridge the SSID traffic locally or forward it through a tunnel.

Option B: Correct. You need to know whether the traffic is bridged or tunneled to determine the VLAN assignments.

Option A: Incorrect. LURs/DURs affect role assignment but not VLAN settings for traffic forwarding.

Option C: Incorrect. Establishing tunnels with gateways is relevant to centralized traffic forwarding, not VLANs for bridged traffic.

Option D: Incorrect. AP IP addressing (static or DHCP) does not impact the VLAN for forwarded SSID traffic.

Integration of CPDI and CPPM for Zero Trust:

CPDI (ClearPass Device Insight) identifies and profiles devices and applications on the network.

CPDI can tag devices based on their behavior or detected applications.

CPPM uses these tags to enforce policies, such as quarantining clients that violate security rules (e.g., using prohibited applications).

Option Analysis:

Option A: Incorrect. CPPM does not inform CPDI about role assignments; CPDI provides device context to CPPM.

Option B: Correct. CPDI tags clients, and CPPM uses those tags to enforce quarantine or other Zero Trust actions.

Option C: Incorrect. Custom fingerprint definitions are not part of this integration.

Option D: Incorrect. CPDI provides information about devices, not user identities.

When the Active Endpoint Security Report on HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass indicates that endpoints have MAC addresses but no known IP addresses, one effective step to address this issue is to add CPPM's (ClearPass Policy Manager) IP address to the IP helper list on routing switches. This configuration ensures that DHCP requests are forwarded to the ClearPass server, allowing it to track and report the IP addresses assigned to the endpoints. This helps ClearPass maintain an accurate mapping of MAC addresses to IP addresses, improving endpoint visibility and security management.

To enforce 802.1X authentication for Windows domain computers to HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) and have the computers authenticate as both machines and users in the same session, you should set up TEAP (Tunneled EAP) as the authentication method. TEAP supports both machine and user authentication within a single 802.1X session, making it suitable for scenarios where both types of authentication are required simultaneously.

HPE Aruba Networking SSE is a cloud-delivered Security Service Edge platform that provides secure web gateway, ZTNA, CASB/DLP, and cloud firewall functions. Threat detection for remote web browsing relies heavily on full traffic inspection, including SSL inspection, URL filtering, and malware scanning.

In Aruba SSE deployments that protect web access from campus/branch or remote users, you:

Integrate the on-prem gateway or AOS-10 environment with SSE using an external web profile, which defines how traffic is sent to SSE.

Within that profile, you enable SSL inspection so that SSE can decrypt and inspect HTTPS traffic, allowing advanced threat detection, DLP, and malware scanning.

Option A: Custom file security profiles can tune malware scanning, but using a non-default profile is not mandatory for basic threat detection.

Option B: SSE already includes built-in anti-malware and sandboxing; it doesn’t require a separate third-party antivirus integration for core features.

Option C: Connectors in SSE are used mainly to reach private applications (ZTNA), not to “reach remote users” for general web browsing.

Therefore, an essential part of enabling threat detection for web browsing is creating an external web profile that enables SSL inspection → Option D.

To enable the detection of rogue APs with HPE Aruba Networking Wireless IDS/IPS (WIDS/WIPS) on AOS-10 APs managed in HPE Aruba Networking Central, each AP must have a Foundation with Security license. This license enables advanced security features, including rogue AP detection, which is crucial for maintaining a secure wireless environment and protecting against unauthorized access points.

To tunnel VoIP phone traffic from AOS-CX switches to an HPE Aruba Networking gateway, you need to configure a User-Based Tunneling (UBT) reserved VLAN on the switches. This VLAN is dedicated for tunneling purposes and ensures that the VoIP traffic is correctly identified and tunneled to the gateway where security policies can be applied.

1.UBT Configuration: Setting a UBT reserved VLAN ensures that the switch knows which VLAN to use for tunneling traffic to the gateway.

2.Traffic Tunneling: The reserved VLAN helps in segregating the VoIP traffic, ensuring it is handled securely and according to the configured policies at the gateway.

3.Policy Application: By tunneling the traffic, the gateway can apply advanced security policies to the VoIP traffic.